


dataflow pointcut in aspect-oriented programming

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joint work with Kazunori Kawauchi

background: aspect-oriented programming (AOP)

- a paradigm for modularizing



motivation & approach


- existing AOP languages can not straightforwardly support some security concerns
 - key factor: flow of information
- our approach: extend AspectJ [Kiczales+2001] to directly support dataflow
 - by adding a new pointcut

a crosscutting concern: XSS prevention

cross-site scripting (XSS):

- an attack to steal secrets from a browser
- by exploiting a problem in a web app.

copying request string into response



prevention, a.k.a. ***sanitizing***:

quote such a string when used in a response

a crosscutting concern: XSS prevention wrt Servlet


sanitizing

replace out.print(s) with

out.print(**quote**(s)) when

- generating responses, and
- the arguments come from the browser's request

- sanitizing is crosscutting:
web apps. usually
generate pages in many classes




prints to be
replaced with

how AspectJ can ^vnot implement sanitizing(1)

- a pointcut specifies “where to sanitize”
i.e., when PrintWriter’s print method is called
from a subclass of Servlet
- one module for many classes

```
aspect Sanitizing {  
    String around(String s) :  
        call(* PrintWriter.print*(String))  
        && within(Servlet+) && args(s){  
            return proceed(quote(s));  
        } ... }  
}
```



how AspectJ can^v not implement sanitizing(2)

- a modified aspect would
 - remember all strings got from a request
 - quote only remembered string at printing

```
aspect Sanitizing {
  Set reqStrs = ...;
  after() returning (String s) : call(* Request.get(String)) {
    reqStrs.add(s); }
  String around(String s) :
    call(* PrintWriter.print*(String)) && within(Servlet+)
    && args(s) && if(reqStrs.contains(s)) {
    return proceed(quote(s));
  } ... }
```

how AspectJ can^v implement sanitizing_{not}(2)

- a modified aspect would
 - remember all strings got from a request
 - quote only remembered string at printing

- ***but not perfect!***

can not detect

“derived” strings;

e.g., concatenated string

```
title = req.get("title");  
name = req.get("name");  
attn = title + " " + name;  
...  
out.println(attn);
```

not a string in request!

observations on sanitizing & AspectJ

sanitizing

replace `out.print(s)` with `out.print(quote(s))` when

- generating responses, and
- the argument ***comes from*** the browser's request

- requires a pointcut to judge the conditions
key: ***flow of information***

whereas

- AspectJ pointcut can only reason about
 - instant properties (e.g., meth. name), and
 - flow of control (e.g., cflow)

our proposal: a new dataflow-based pointcut `dflow`

issues:

- design
 - combination with the other pointcuts
 - clear semantics
 - exceptional cases for practical use
 - to exclude some dataflows
 - to handle “native” code
- efficient implementation

sanitizing with dflow

sanitizing

replace `out.print(s)` with `out.print(quote(s))` when

- generating responses, and
- the argument comes from the browser's request

```
aspect Sanitizing {  
    String around (String s) :  
        call(void print(String)) && args(s)  
        && dflow[ s, userInput ]  
        ( call(String Request.get())  
          && returns(userinput) ) {  
        proceed(quote(s));  
    } ... }  
}
```


- declarative
- can be combined with the other pointcuts

how dflow works (1)

checks how values
are generated
wrt sub-pointcut

```
Aspect Sanitizing {  
  around (String s) :  
    call(void print(String)) && args(s)  
    && dflow[ s, userInput ]  
    ( call(String Request.get())  
      && returns(userinput) )  
    proceed(quote(s));  
}
```

web app.'s
activity




how dflow works (2)

it tracks back

- to “indirect” origins
- across modules

```
object Sanitizing {  
  string around (String s) :  
    call(void print(String)) && args(s)  
    && dflow[ s, userInput ]  
    ( call(String Request.get()  
      && returns(userinput) )  
    proceed(quote(s));  
  . }  
}
```




semantics of `dflow`

`dflow[dst,src](p)` matches jp if $\exists jp'$ in the past s.t.


- jp' matches p
- p binds a val. in jp' to src
- dst originates from src

* jp (join point):
a point in execution



auxiliary constructs

- **bypassing** to exclude some dataflow
e.g., avoid quoting strings twice
- **propagate** to manually connect dataflow through “native” code



implementations of dflow

- a proof-of-concept implementation
 - interpretive;
 - based on Aspect SandBox interpreter
[Wand+02,Masuhara+03]
- a practical implementation
 - under development
 - translator to plain AspectJ language


an interpreter-based implementation

- base implementation: AspectJ-like AOP
 - for each dynamic operation (e.g., method call) to be performed,
 - match each jp against pointcuts
 - run advice body when match
- extension for dflow
 - associate a tag to a value when the value originates from a dflow-specified value

how tags are manipulated

1. gives a tag to dflow (preprocess)
2. tags a value
3. propagates tags
4. checks tags

```
...  
    proceed(quote(s));  
    . }  
...  
    call(void print(String)) && args(s)  
    && dflow[ s, userInput ]  
    ( call(String Request.get())  
    && returns(userinput) )
```



towards translation-based implementation

- basic strategy:
 - insert code for tag operations***
into target program
 - most operations can be done by AspectJ
 - finer-grained translation for propagation
- static analysis would eliminate operations for statically-known dataflow

discussion


- languages with information-flow analysis [JFlow, SLam, taint-Perl, etc.]
 - more than “dataflow” (cf. implicit flow)
 - not for modularization
- AOP w/ finer-grained jps [Walker+03]
 - could implement dataflow-tracking aspects
 - but less declarative, and less opportunity to optimize

conclusion

- **dflow**: dataflow-based pointcut
 - useful to declaratively modularize
some security concerns
 - would be useful in more general situations
cf. cflow in AspectJ discriminates
polymorphic code by calling context
 - smoothly integrated with existing AOP lang.
 - needs further semantics/implementation
work for practical use

why not sanitize when it gets a request?

- because quoting depends
on the destination




can dflow track dataflow in the database?


- no,
- but it helps manual tracking
by writing an aspect that
 - flags when it writes a record containing
a request string
 - regards a flagged record as
a request string

is it useful to concerns other than securities?

- cflow specifies execution context



- dflow specifies value context



if web app. concatenates
request-string with valid HTML?

- need to modify the pointcut to
capture such concat. operation
instead of print operation
- only need to modify the pointcut